Class Actions: The Canadian Experience by Watson, Garry D.
WATSON.DOC 07/10/01 8:57 AM
269
CLASS ACTIONS:
THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE
GARRY D. WATSON*
In the last seven years, Canada has developed a vigorous class ac-
tion regime.  Before outlining that regime, I would like to address the
question: “Why have Class Actions?”
I.  WHY HAVE CLASS ACTIONS?
A foundational document in Canada on class actions is the On-
tario Law Reform Commission’s (OLRC) Report on Class Actions
(1982).1  It is an excellent three volume report that bases its recom-
mendation of the introduction of class actions in Ontario on three
underlying policy objectives.
The first, and most important objective, is to afford greater access
to justice.  Litigation has become so expensive that claims of modest
amounts, and even those of significant amounts, are not economically
feasible to pursue on an individual basis. In class action terminology,
these are referred to as “individually non-viable claims.”  There are
many more individually non-viable claims in Canada than in the
United States for several reasons: (1) Canada has ceilings on damages
for pain and suffering in personal injury cases, and relative to awards
in the United States, these ceilings are very low;2 (2) Canadian courts
rarely award punitive damages;3 (3) the vast majority of civil actions
Copyright  2001 by Garry D. Watson.
* Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto.
1. ONTARIO LAW REFORM COMMISSION, Report on Class Actions, in 3 SUMMARY OF
RECOMMENDATIONS § 56 (1982).
2. See Andrews v. Grand & Toy Alberta Ltd. [1978] 2 S.C.R. 229 (Can.).  The court in
Andrews held $100,000 as the appropriate award for non-pecuniary loss in the case of a young
quadriplegic, and save in exceptional cases, that this should be regarded as the upper limit on
any award for non-pecuniary loss; less catastrophic cases would receive less.  Flexibility in the
amount should be allowed to deal with changing economic factors such as inflation.  The
$100,000 amount was measured in 1978 and should be adjusted accordingly.  See S.M.
WADDAMS, THE LAW OF DAMAGES 185 (1997).  By 1995, this upper limit was calculated at
$225,000.  See Koukounakis v. Stainrod [1995] 23 O.R. (3d) 299 (C.A.), 55 A.C.W.S. (3d) 93
(Can.).
3. See Joseph Y. Obagi & Elizabeth A. Quigley, Making a Claim for Punitive Damages
Against First Party Insurers, 24 ADVOC. Q. 4 (2001).
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in Canada are tried by judges sitting alone rather than being tried by
relatively uncontrolled juries as in the United States;4 and (4) Canada
has a fee shifting rule (generally the losing party must pay a large part
of the winning party’s legal fees), which is a major deterrent to litiga-
tion.5
The second policy objective is to improve judicial efficiency.
Where the alternative to a class action is repetitive litigation relating
to the same events, the result is judicial inefficiency.  For example,
when class action certification was refused for claims against Canada’s
blood system relating to transfusion-related AIDS transmission,6
more than eighty such cases were filed in Ontario alone.  The filing of
individual claims resulted in three very long trials without significant
plaintiff-wide settlements.7  Such individual actions often cover the
same ground time and again; they are not only inefficient, but can
lead to inconsistent decisions.  It is noteworthy that the judicial effi-
ciency rationale really only comes into play where the claims asserted
are individually viable; permitting class actions for individually non-
viable claims brings about litigation which would, without class ac-
tions, never be brought.  This may increase the judicial workload and
thereby decrease judicial efficiency.
4. See GARRY D. WATSON ET AL., THE CIVIL LITIGATION PROCESS 18 (1999).
5. See id. at 363.
6. See Sutherland v. Canadian Red Cross Soc’y [1994] 112 D.L.R. (4th) 504 (Ont. Gen.
Div.) (Can.) (denying certification of a class action for lack of common issues to people who
sought to recover damages resulting from their contraction of HIV from transfusions of con-
taminated blood and blood products); Garry D. Watson & Michael McGowan, Annual Survey
of Recent Developments in Civil Procedure, in ONTARIO CIVIL PRACTICE ci (Garry D. Watson
& Michael McGowan eds., 1995) (providing a critical analysis of this decision).  Subsequently,
two judges who presided at lengthy HIV trials have questioned the wisdom of the decision in
Sutherland.  See Pittman Estate v. Bayed [1994] 112 D.L.R. (4th) 482 (Ont. Gen. Div.) (Can.);
see also Walker v. York-Finch Hospital [1997] 66 A.C.W.S. (3d) 81 (Can.).
7. The court in Sutherland, supra note 6, observed that at the time of that decision 84 HIV
cases were pending in Ontario.  The court in Anderson v. Wilson stated: “The judicial experi-
ence of this court with individual trials in tainted blood cases suggests that individual trials are
not always the best way to deal with mass medical catastrophes.”  Anderson v. Wilson [1989]
156 D.L.R. (4th) 735, 746 (Ont. Div. Ct.) (Can.).  The problems of proceeding with separate tri-
als in cases of common medical catastrophe are referred to by Judge Lang in Pittman Estate v.
Bain [1994] 19 C.C.L.T. (2d) 1 at 202, 112 D.L.R. (4th) 257 (Ont. Gen. Div.) (Can.), and Judge
Borins in Walker v. York-Finch Hospital [1997] O.J. No. 4017 ¶ 203ff (Gen. Div.) (Can.).  As
Judge Borins said, “Innovative procedures should be considered in mass tort litigation as a
method of structuring multiple claims to obtain the benefit of a judicial decision in respect to
issues common to all cases, which becomes binding in respect to all claimants . . . Finally, and
with respect, it may be appropriate to revisit the decision of this court in Sutherland v. Canadian
Red Cross Society [1994], 112 D.L.R.(4th) 504 with respect to whether claims of this nature are
appropriate for certification as a class proceeding.’” Walker v. York-Finch Hospital [1997] O.J.
No. 4017 ¶ 212 (Gen. Div.) (Can.).
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The third policy objective is to achieve behavioral modification.
When manufacturers and other entities can inflict small amounts of
damage on a large number of people who cannot afford to litigate in-
dividual claims, the deterrent function of the law, such as tort law, is
lost.  Hopefully, subjecting potential defendants to the risk of a class
action will modify their behavior.
Canadian courts refer to the above social or policy objectives
constantly when interpreting class action legislation.8
II.  ARE THERE WORKABLE ALTERNATIVES TO CLASS
ACTIONS IN THE CANADIAN CONTEXT?
For certain types of personal injury claims, Canada has non-class
action solutions.  These, however, are not tailored specifically to
widespread injury problems.  First, part of Canada’s social safety net
is a national, government-run “medicare” system.  The “medicare”
system provides health care for all Canadians, including the medical
and hospitalization expenses of injured persons.9  Second, some Ca-
nadian provinces have introduced “no-fault” automobile accident in-
surance schemes that provide accident victims with benefits on a no-
fault basis and without having to sue in court.10  Third, for several
decades, all provinces have had worker’s compensation legislation,
providing persons suffering from work–related injuries with compen-
sation on a no-fault basis and forbidding resort to the courts in rela-
tion to such injuries.  This explains why Canada, unlike the United
States, has not had asbestosis litigation.11
8. See, e.g.,Chadha et al. v. Bayer Inc. [1999] 45 O.R. (3d) 29 at 36 (Ont. Gen. Div) (Can.).
In Chadha, a case involving many small price-fixing claims, Sharpe, J. stated: “Three important
objects have been identified as underlying the Act: (1) judicial economy, (2) improved access to
the  courts for those whose actions might not otherwise be asserted,  and (3) modification of be-
haviour of actual or potential  wrongdoers who might otherwise be tempted to ignore public
obligations . . . If the present  action is to be certified, among these three objects, the  primary
one to be served would be behaviour modification.  Certification would provide access to the
courts in circumstances where the claims might not otherwise be asserted.  However, it is appar-
ent from the nature and size of the claim of any individual that the goal of providing a proce-
dure to ensure that victims of wrongdoing are actually compensated is secondary. Similarly, as it
is unlikely that any claim would come before the court absent a class action, judicial economy
would not be significantly enhanced.”
9. See DIANE LONGLEY, HEALTH CARE CONSTITUTIONS 21 (1996).
10. See J. McCarthy & Joseph Pasquariello, The Threshold in Ontario Automobile Insur-
ance Litigation: A Serious and Important Question, 16 THE ADVOCATES’ QUARTERLY 63
(1994).
11. See, e.g., Workplace Safety and Insurance Act, S.O., ch. 16 (1997) (Can.).  See generally
RESEARCH IN CANADIAN WORKER’S COMPENSATION (Terry Thomason & Richard
Chaykowki eds., 1995).
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Although there may be ad hoc schemes for individual disasters
(e.g., farm disasters, floods, transmission of HIV infection through the
national blood bank systems), Canada has no government-
administered compensation schemes generally aimed at mass wrongs.
Interestingly, however, in cases in which a government or government
agent is the defendant, the existence and institution of class actions
have led to government–financed compensatory packages (e.g., those
resulting from claims by persons infected with Hepatitis C through
the national blood bank system12 and recent cases involving pollution
of a town’s water supply by e-coli bacteria).13
As discussed previously, individual litigation, including joinder of
multiple parties, does not generally compensate the victims of mass
wrongs because it is too expensive, discouraging actions from being
brought.  Therefore, in Canada there is really no viable alternative to
class actions once it is acknowledged that there is a need to provide
access to justice and to compensate people for mass wrongs.
III.  AN OVERVIEW OF THE CANADIAN CLASS
ACTION REGIME14
Class action legislation has existed in Quebec since 1978, but
class actions only became a major force in Canada with the passage of
the Ontario Class Proceedings Act in 199315 and the subsequent Brit-
ish Columbia Class Proceedings Act in 199516 (which in many, but not
all respects, mirrors the Ontario legislation).
The procedures provided by the legislation in each of the three
provinces are structurally similar to those prescribed by Rule 23 of
the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, although in certain re-
spects the Canadian legislation is more liberal in facilitating class ac-
tions than its American counterpart.17  The Canadian legislation per-
12. See Parsons v. Canadian Red Cross Soc’y [1999], 40 C.P.C. (4th) 151 (Ont. Sup. Ct.),
101 A.C.W.S. (3d) 694 (Can.).
13. See Colin Perkel, Walkerton Victims Want to Sue, THE TORONTO STAR, Jan. 15, 2001,
available at <http://www.thestar.com>.
14. The leading textbooks on the subject are M. EIZENGA ET AL., CLASS ACTIONS LAW
AND PRACTICE (1999) and WARD K. BRANCH, CLASS ACTIONS IN CANADA (1996).  Two brief
guides are JAMES M. SULLIVAN, A GUIDE TO THE BRITISH COLUMBIA CLASS PROCEEDINGS
ACT (1997) and MICHAEL G. COCHRANE, CLASS ACTIONS: A GUIDE TO THE CLASS
PROCEEDINGS ACT, 1992 (1993).
15. Class Proceedings Act, S.O., ch.6 (1992) (Can.).
16. Class Proceedings Act, S. B. C., ch.21 (1995) (Can.).
17. See M. McGowan, Certification of Class Actions in Ontario: A Comparison of Rule 23
of the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in 16 CARSWELL PRACTICE CASES 172 (1993).
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mitting class actions embodies, as does the regime in the United
States, a “lawyer-entrepreneur model.”  It relies upon lawyer-
entrepreneurs to initiate and drive class actions, allowing lawyers to
risk non-payment for losing cases in the hopes of recovering substan-
tial court–awarded contingency fees when the cases are successful.18
The Canadian criteria19 for certification of a proceeding as a class
action are relatively undemanding. The claim must disclose a cause of
action. There must be an identifiable class of two or more persons.
The claims of the class must raise common issues.  A class action must
be the preferable procedure for resolving these common issues.  The
representative plaintiff must fairly and adequately represent the inter-
ests of the class, not have a conflict on the common issues with other
class members, and have a workable plan for processing the action.20
The only criteria of those enumerated that usually are difficult to sat-
isfy are the existence of common issues and determining whether a
class action is the preferable procedure.
The following are the other major features of the Canadian class
action regime.21
A. Notice
Notice to class members of certification and settlement is normal
but not mandatory.  The court may determine how it is to be given or
dispensed with and who will bear the cost.
B. Opt Out
Once the proceeding is certified, members of the class are pre-
sumed to be in the proceeding and are bound by the court’s determi-
nation, unless they take active steps to “opt out” within a time set by
the court.
18. See Gagne v. Silcorp Ltd. [1998] 41 O.R. (3d) 416 (C.A.) (Can.); see also Ontario’s New
Class Proceedings Legislation—An Analysis, in 2 ONTARIO CIVIL PRACTICE  751 (Garry D.
Watson & Michael McGowan eds., 2001).
19. The criteria in the text appear in both the Ontario and British Columbia legislation; the
criteria in Quebec are slightly, but not materially, different: see Quebec Code of Civil Proce-
dure, R.S.Q., ch. C-25., §§ 1000 et seq. (Can.).
20. See Class Proceedings Act, S.O., ch. 6, § 5 (1992) (Can.); see also Class Proceedings
Act, S.B.C., ch. 21, § 4 (1995) (Can.).
21. Again, these features are based on the legislation in Ontario and British Columbia; the
Quebec legislation is slightly, but not materially, different.  For Ontario procedure, see Class
Proceedings Act, S.O., ch. 6 (1992) (Can.); for B.C. procedure, see Class Proceedings Act,
S.B.C., ch. 21 (1995) (Can.).  For a more detailed summary of the major features of Canadian
class action regime, see Ontario’s New Class Proceedings Legislation—An Analysis, supra note
18, at 753-758.
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C. Discovery
At the certification and common issues phases, discovery is
prima facie limited to the named parties.  The defendant is given the
right to examine for discovery (i.e., depose) only the class representa-
tive and not other individual class members; after deposing the class
representative, the defendant may request leave from the court for
discovery of other individual class members (this regime is consistent
with the general approach in Canada to the availability of discovery).
D. Settlements
To ensure the protection of absent class members, the settlement
of all actions commenced under the Class Proceedings Act, whether
or not they are certified, must be approved by the court.
E. Fee Shifting
This has been an area of considerable difficulty for class actions
in Canada. Unlike in the United States, the general rule in litigation
in Canada is the so-called “English rule,” that a losing party must
usually pay the winning parties’ legal fees, or a good portion thereof.
The challenge has been synthesising this rule with class actions: if the
class action fails, who is liable for the defendant’s legal fees and other
costs?  For litigation in which the class does not prevail, each Prov-
ince’s class action statute stipulates that the representative plaintiff is
the only class member liable for defendant’s legal fees and other
costs.  When and to what extent the representative plaintiff is liable
varies amongst the three provinces.  British Columbia adopted the
Ontario Law Reform Commission’s recommendation,22 rendering the
representative plaintiff virtually immune from paying costs – she is
only liable if the action is “frivolous or vexatious” (merely losing is
not enough).  Quebec allows for costs against the representative
plaintiff, but after one very large costs award the legislation changed,
allowing only nominal costs to be paid (on the scale of the small
claims court).23  Ontario is the most extreme.  The legislation provides
that costs can be awarded against a losing representative plaintiff,
unless the court is of the view that the action was a “test case, raised a
22. See Report on Class Actions, supra note 1; see also Class Proceedings Act, S.B.C., ch.
21, § 37 (1995) (Can.).
23. See Ontario’s New Class Proceedings Legislation—An Analysis, supra note 18, at 757;
see also L. Fox, Liability for Costs: A Comparison of Bill 28 and Bill 29 and the Quebec Legisla-
tion, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST YVES PRATTE CONFERENCE (1992).
WATSON.DOC 07/10/01  8:57 AM
2001] THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE 275
novel point of law or involved a matter of public interest.”24  To date,
relatively few significant costs awards have been made against plain-
tiffs, and representative plaintiffs have largely avoided having to pay
costs.25  Most cases were settled, and very few cases have been adjudi-
cated to a conclusion. The Ontario costs rule is problematic and
causes difficulties because it raises the issue of who, properly advised,
would agree to become a representative plaintiff.  After all, the repre-
sentative plaintiff in successful claims will only recover her pro-rata
share of damages (e.g., $5000 or $10,000) but will risk being held li-
able for the costs of a million dollar action.  Although it is not clear
what is happening “out in the field,” possibly plaintiff class counsels
are not properly advising representative plaintiffs of the risks in-
volved, are choosing judgment-proof plaintiffs, or are agreeing to in-
demnify the representative plaintiff for the costs of the action.  If the
former—if plaintiff class counsels are not informing their clients of
the risks—a malpractice action might be necessary to clear the air.
An Ontario Class Proceedings Fund exists26 primarily to relieve
the representative plaintiff from liability for the defendant’s costs. It
works in the following way: when a plaintiff applies to, and receives
assistance from, the Fund, the Fund becomes liable to pay any costs
awarded to the defendant, and in such circumstances, the representa-
tive plaintiff is relieved of any liability for the defendant’s costs.27
However, the Fund has been a failure in that, due to inadequate fi-
nancing, it has given funding to very few class actions (approximately
24. Class Proceedings Act, S.O., ch. 6, § 31(1) (1992) (Can.).
25. For example, in Elliot v. CBC [1994] 24 C.P.C. (3d) 143 (Gen. Div.) (Can.), in the ab-
sence of any of the factors enumerated in § 31(1) or any other special circumstances, the court
applied the customary rule that costs “follow the event,” and costs were awarded against the
unsuccessful representative plaintiffs.  In Joncas v. Spruce Falls [2000] O.J. No. 1721 (Ont. Gen.
Div.) (online Quicklaw), 97 A.C.W.S. (3d) 72 (Can.), in dismissing a class action brought by
employees seeking entitlement to certain shares, costs were ordered against the representative
plaintiffs.  In Smith v. Canadian Tire Acceptance Ltd. [1995] 22 O.R. (3d) 433 (Gen. Div.)
(Can.), the costs of an unsuccessful class action were awarded against non-parties who had pro-
moted the action and had purported to have sold rights in the proceeds of the action to the pub-
lic.
26. See Law Society Amendment Act (Class Proceedings Funding), S.O., ch. 7 (1992)
(Can.), and a regulation made under the Act (O. Reg. 771/92). Quebec also has a “fonds,” but
its purpose is to fund the plaintiff’s side of class actions, and it does not relieve an unsuccessful
representative plaintiff of liability for the defendants’ costs.  See Ontario’s New Class Proceed-
ings Legislation—An Analysis, supra note 18; see also An Act Respecting the Class Action,
L.R.Q., Chap. R-2.1 (Can.).
27. See Law Society Amendment Act (Class Proceedings Funding), supra note 26, at §
59.1(2)2, § 59.4.
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six to date).28  It started out with an initial capital of $500,000,29 to be
“topped up” by a levy of ten percent of any settlement or judgment in
any action it has funded.30  The Fund has been extremely cautious in
funding class actions because one cost order could wipe it out.  Pre-
sumably, the expectation of the drafters establishing the Fund was
that all representative plaintiffs would apply to the fund.  However,
applications to the fund have been few (approximately thirty cases),
and most importantly, the “big, successful” cases have not applied.31
The Fund received a levy in one case and it now has a balance of
about $700,000, together with a liability for an as yet unpaid cost
award of $240,000.32  Had the big cases applied for funding, the Fund
would actually be in a position of extreme (and perhaps embarrass-
ing) wealth because to date there have been a number of substantial
settlements in Ontario class actions (e.g., the heart pacemaker litiga-
tion settled for $23.1 million,33 the breast implant litigation for $29
million,34 and the vanishing life insurance premium cases for approxi-
mately $140 million35). The total recovery for the class members in
these actions alone was $206 million; a ten percent levy on these re-
coveries would have yielded the fund an additional $20.6 million.
This is without even taking into account the $1.5 billion settlement in
28. As explained in the text, the Fund’s initial capitalization was low—approximately
$500,000—and the mechanism designed to provide the Fund with a periodic income flow, the
“levy” device, has not been successful.  This is because the “big cases” which could have pro-
vided a substantial income flow did not apply for funding, and hence were not subject to paying
the levy.  The information in the text as to the number of applications to the Fund and the num-
ber of successful cases comes from first-hand knowledge; the Author has been a member of the
committee administering the Fund. The Law Foundation of Ontario has responsibility for over-
seeing the Fund.  The Foundation’s web page provides annual reports on the Funds operations
at <http://www.lawfoundation_on.org/LF.pdf.>
29. See Law Society Amendment Act (Class Proceedings Funding), supra note 26, at §
59.1(1).
30. The ten percent levy is provided for in Ontario Regulation 771/92, see supra note 26.
31. See cases infra nn. 33-36.
32. The Fund received a levy as a result of a settlement favorable to the plaintiff class in
Mangan v. Inco Ltd. [1998] 38 O.R. (3d) 703 (Gen. Div.) (Can.).  The unpaid cost award arises
from an order made against the Fund in Edwards v. Law Society of Upper Canada [2000] 188
D.L.R. (4th) 613 (Can.).
33. Nantais v. Telectronics Proprietary (Canada) Ltd. [1995] 129 D.L.R. (4th) 110 (Ont.
Gen. Div.) (Can.), prob. juris. noted, 127 D.L.R. (4th) 552 (Can.).  Details of the amount of the
settlement were given in THE GLOBE AND MAIL MONDAY, Oct. 6, 1997, at A1.
34. Serwaczek v. Medical Engineering Corp. [1996] 3 C.P.C. (4th) 386 (Gen. Div.) (Can.).
35. There have been settlements in two such cases. See Dabbs v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of
Canada [1998] 40 O.R. (3d) 776 (Gen. Div.) (Can.); McKrow v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co.
[1998] O.J. No. 4692 (Ont. Gen. Div.)  (online Quicklaw).
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the Hepatitis C case.36  How can the Fund meet its objective more
successfully?  One approach might be to change the legislation to ap-
ply a much lower levy (e.g., one to two percent) on all class action re-
coveries, whether or not funded by the Fund. Another approach
could be to simply let the Fund expire (on the grounds that class ac-
tions are alive and well in Ontario without a successfully functioning
Fund).  Alternatively, in light of the failure of the Class Proceedings
Fund to adequately deal with the fee shifting issue, it can be argued
that Ontario should amend its Act and resort to the British Columbia
model, which virtually abandons fee shifting in class actions.
F. Class Counsels’ Fees
The court determines the fees for class counsel, typically using a
combination of a multiplier test (i.e., hours worked multiplied by the
hourly rate) and a percentage contingency fee.37  Usually these fees
come out of the damages recovered by the class.
G. National Classes
Because the courts (particularly in Ontario) have permitted na-
tional classes (i.e., actions in which the class as defined is not limited
36. See Parsons v. Canadian Red Cross Soc’y, supra note 12.
37. The Ontario Act specifically provides for the use of a multiplier approach in fixing
counsel’s fees.  See supra note 26, at §§ 32-33. However, Nantais v. Telectronics Proprietary
(Canada) Ltd. [1996] 134 D.L.R. (4th) 47 (Ont. Gen. Div.) (Can.) held that the fee arrange-
ments permitted by the Class Proceedings Act are not limited to the “multiplier” approach set
out in §§ 32-33, and contingency fees are also permitted.  In practice, Ontario courts have
tended to use a combination of a multiplier fee and a contingency fee.  See, e.g., Parsons v. Ca-
nadian Red Cross Soc’y, [2001] 46 C.P.C. (4th) 236 (Ont. Superior Ct.) (award of counsel fees in
excess of $50 million). The British Columbia legislation makes no reference to a multiplier test,
having held that a percentage contingency fee should be used to fix counsel’s fees.  See Endean
v. Canadian Red Cross, [2000] B.C.J. No. 1254 (B.C.S.C.) (online Quicklaw), 97 A.C.W.S. (3d)
550 (Can.).  In Gagne v. Silcorp Ltd., supra note 18, the court addressed the purpose of award-
ing premium fees in successful class proceedings.  Also, in Parsons, Judge Winkler restated the
Gagne principle in the following terms:
If the Class Proceedings Act is to achieve the legislative objective of providing en-
hanced access to justice, then in large part it will be dependent upon the willingness of
counsel to undertake litigation on the understanding that there is a risk that the ex-
penses incurred in time and disbursements may never be recovered.  It is in this con-
text that a court, in approving a fee arrangement or an exercise of fixing fees, must de-
termine the fairness and reasonableness of the counsel fee. Accordingly, the caselaw
that has developed in Ontario holds that the fairness and reasonableness of the fee
awarded in respect of class proceedings is to be determined in the light of the risk un-
dertaken by the solicitor in conducting the litigation and the degree of success or re-
sults achieved.
Parsons v. Canadian Red Cross Soc’y, [2001] 46 C.P.C. (4th) 236, at 241.
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to Ontario residents, but any Canadian resident),38 the effect has been
to extend the class action regime even to those provinces that have
not enacted class action legislation.
IV.  VOLUME AND TYPES OF CLASS ACTION LITIGATION
Although exact numbers are unavailable, it is likely that since
1993 a quite high volume of cases, some two hundred class actions,
have been commenced in Ontario (and a lesser number in British
Columbia).  Many prospective class actions still await certification,
and only two cases have been tried (although several cases have been
resolved by summary judgment, typically in favor of the defendant).
There, however, have been numerous settlements.39
Class actions have included a wide variety of cases.  Tort cases
have included numerous product liability cases (e.g., defective heart
pacemaker,40 breast implants,41 Hepatitis C-contaminated blood42) and
mass tort cases (e.g., subway crash,43 train crash,44 water pollution,45
sexual abuse at a residential school for native children46).  Contract
cases have included consumer class actions (e.g., against utilities47 and
credit card companies48 for alleged illegal interest rates and other
charges, recovery of interest on condominium deposits,49 recovery of
damages for misrepresentations in the sale of a housing develop-
ment,50 litigation over “vanishing premium” life insurance policies51)
and wrongful dismissal actions for mass dismissals usually following a
38. The case law permitting national classes is conveniently summarized in Wilson v. Ser-
vier Canada Inc. and Biofarma S.A. [2000] 50 O.R. (3d) 219 (Ont. Sup. Ct.) (Can.).
39. The two class actions that have gone to trial are Windisman v. Toronto College Park
Ltd. [1996] 28 O.R. (3d) 29 (Gen. Div.) (Can.), and Peppiatt v. Nicol [1998] O.J. No.3370 (Ont.
Gen. Div.) (online Quicklaw), 82 A.C.W.S. (3d) 243.
40. See Nantais v. Telectronics Proprietary (Canada) Ltd., supra note 33.
41. See Serwaczek v. Medical Engineering Corp., supra note 34; Bendall v. McGhan Medi-
cal Corp. [1993] 106 D.L.R. (4th) 339 (Ont. Gen. Div.) (Can.).
42. See Parsons v. Canadian Red Cross Soc’y, supra note 12.
43. See Godi v. Toronto Transit Comm’n (Doc. 95 CU 89529) (Gen. Div.) (Can.).
44. See Brimner v. Via Rail Canada Inc. [2000] 47 O.R. (3d) 793 (Ont. Sup. Ct.) (Can.).
45. See Perkel, supra note 13.
46. See Lumley v. British Columbia [1999] B.C.J. No. 2633 (B.C.C.A.) (Can.) (online
Quicklaw).
47. See Garland v. Consumers’ Gas Co. [1998] 3 S.C.R. 112 (Can.).
48. See Smith v. Canadian Tire Acceptance Ltd., supra note 25.
49. See Windisman v. Toronto College Park Ltd., supra note 39.
50. See Peppiatt v. Nicol, supra note 39.
51. See Dabbs v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, supra note 35; McKrow v. Manufac-
turers Life Ins. Co., supra note 35.
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takeover.52  There have also been various miscellaneous cases (e.g.,
corporate disputes,53 price fixing competition cases,54 franchising,55
pension surplus,56 native land claims,57 and copyright58).
Some have been “mega cases” with “mega” recoveries,59 others
have been relatively small cases, illustrating that there are many di-
verse instances where numerous people are wronged—people who
would never sue or obtain recovery without class actions (e.g., the
condominium deposit interest case involving defective fireplaces in a
condominium development,60 and a copyright infringement case
where freelance journalists sued a major publisher for allegedly re-
publishing print media articles in electronic form without the authors’
permission61).
V.  WHAT HAVE BEEN THE MAJOR ISSUES TO DATE, AND
HOW HAVE THE COURTS HANDLED THEM?
A. Certification
To date, certification has been a major battleground. Defendants
have fought hard to avoid certification, with mixed success.62  Courts,
however, have sometimes refused certification for reasons having lit-
tle to do with the statutory criteria—judges identify an action as a
“bad class action” (which is never really defined), and the reasons
given for refusing certification may be disingenuous or lack transpar-
52. See Gagne v. Silcorp Ltd., supra note 18; Halabi v. Becker Milk Co. [1998] 39 O.R. (3d)
153 (Gen. Div), Atkinson v. Ault Foods Ltd. [1997] O.J. No. 5222 (Ont. Gen. Div.) (Can.). (on-
line Quicklaw), Webb v. K-Mart Canada Ltd. [1999] O.J. No. 2742 (Ont. Sup. Ct.) (Can.). (on-
line Quicklaw), 91 A.C.W.S. (3d) 18.
53. See Maxwell v. MLG Ventures Ltd. [1996] 30 O.R. (3d) 304 (Gen. Div.) (Can.).
54. See Chadha v. Bayer Inc., supra note 8.
55. See Rosedale Motors Inc. v. PetroCanada Inc. [1998] 42 O.R. (3d) 776 (Gen. Div.)
(Can.).
56. See Cooper Industries (Canada) Inc v. Babin, B173/95 (Can.); Cooper Industries (Can.)
Inc. v. Adam, B172/95 (Can.); Rivett v. Hospitals of Ontario Pension Plan [1995] O.J. No. 3270
(Gen. Div.) (online Quicklaw), 58 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1180 (Can.).
57. See Chippewas of Sarnia Band v. Canada (Attorney General) [1996] 45 C.P.C. (3d) 216
(Ont. Gen. Div.) (Can.).
58. See Robertson v. The Thomson Corp. [1993] 43 O.R. (3d) 389 (Gen. Div.) (Can.).
59. See cases referred to under the discussion of the Ontario Class Proceeding Fund, supra
notes 33-36.
60. See Crawford v. London (City) [2000] O.J. No. 989 (Ont. Sup. Ct.) (online Quicklaw),
98 A.C.W.S. (3d) 527 (Can.).
61. See Robertson v. The Thomson Corp., supra note 58.
62. See cases supra notes 40-58 and infra notes 64-67.
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ency63 (e.g., cases involving a tax driven real estate development,64
fungus in the bathrooms of an apartment building,65 a nuisance claim
in respect of Toronto’s garbage dump66).  Class certifications have not
been awarded readily in the numerous verbal misrepresentation cases
because of the apparent lack of a common issue and the presence of
numerous individual issues.67  Certification in such cases is unlikely to
be granted unless the court is prepared to “compress” the individual
injuries into a common issue.68
B. Settlements
The issue of settlement in class actions is always problematic be-
cause of the risk that plaintiff class counsel will, with or without col-
luding with the defendant, “sell out” the class (settle for less than the
case is really worth) to gain what the counsel sees as a satisfactory
fee.69  Many have observed that the ever-present risk in class actions is
63. See Honorable Mr. Justice Warren Winkler, Advocacy in Class Proceedings Litigation,
19 ADVOCATES’ SOC. J. 6, 9 (2000) (expressing the issue of certification in highly subjective
terms: “In the final analysis, a class proceeding is a visceral thing: if it feels to experienced coun-
sel like a class action, it probably should be one. On the other hand, if it looks and feels like a
series of individual actions, it is not likely to be certified as a class proceeding.”)
64. See Abdool v. Anaheim Management Ltd. [1995] 21 O.R. (3d) 453 (Div. Ct.) (Can.) (a
class action by investors in a condominium scheme).
65. See Taub v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co. [1998] 40 O.R. (3d) 379 (Ont. Gen. Div.)
(Can.) (the court held that if widespread harm is not inherent in a class action claim, such as air
crashes or pollution cases, the plaintiff must provide evidence that more than one person was
affected; in alleging toxic mold in bathrooms of an apartment complex, the court required evi-
dence that at least one person other than the plaintiff had a similar claim).
66. See Hollick v. Toronto [1999] 46 O.R. (3d) 257 (C.A.) (Can.) granted leave to appeal
(holding that a court may look beyond the pleadings to the evidence to evaluate the certification
criteria; in ascertaining the existence of a class, the court can include some consideration of the
merits and can look beyond the statement of claimed to make that assessment).
67. See, e.g., Rosedale Motors Inc. v. Petro-Canada  Inc., supra note 55; Mouhteros v.
DeVry Canada Inc. [1998] 41 O.R. (3d) 63 (Ont. Gen. Div.) (Can.); Controltech Eng’g Inc. v.
Ontario Hydro [1998] O.J. No. 5350 (Gen. Div.) (online Quicklaw), 84 A.C.W.S. (3d) 836
(Can.).
68. See, e.g., Dabbs v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, supra note 35 (where the court
certified a “vanishing premium” class action for settlement purposes against a life insurer based
on alleged misrepresentations notwithstanding that these were allegedly made by hundreds of
individual insurance agents in individual conversations with policyholders).  Cf. Williams v. Mu-
tual Life Assurance Co. of Canada, [2000] O.J. No. 3821 (Ont. Sup. Ct.) (online Quicklaw), 100
A.C.W.S. (3d) 387 (Can.) (certification refused in similar case where defendant opposed certifi-
cation).
69. As the U.S. Supreme Court observed in its recent decision in Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.,
119 S. Ct. 2295, 2318 (1999), rev’g sub nom. In re Asbestos Litig., 134 F.3d 668 (5th Cir. 1998).
(“In a strictly rational world, plaintiff’s counsel would always press for the limit of what the de-
fense would pay.  But with an already enormous fee within counsel’s grasp, zeal for the client
may relax sooner than it would in a case brought on behalf of one claimant.”)
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that the defendant will obtain a below-market settlement by seeing
that the plaintiffs’ lawyer gets an above-market counsel fee.70  The re-
cent report by the Rand Institute for Civil Justice documents at
length the problems experienced in the United States relating to the
failure of courts to adequately supervise the approval of settlements
and the setting of class counsel fees. 71
As previously discussed, Canada’s legislation specifically pro-
vides that court approval is required for the settlement of any class
action, whether or not it has been certified.72 After a somewhat fal-
tering start,73 the courts appear to be doing a reasonable job in this
area. They are still not sufficiently aware of potential conflicts of in-
terest, or of the potential for the parties in mass tort cases to “sell
out” future claimants in favor of present claimants (which is now a
well recognized problem in the United States74), but early indications
show that Canadian courts are perhaps doing a better job of super-
vising the approval of settlements than are their U.S. counterparts.75
In two significant cases, courts recently refused to approve settle-
ments. In the Hepatitis C litigation, the trial court wrote an eighty-
five-page judgment on the settlement approval hearing and refused to
approve the proposed $1.5 billion settlement until changes were
70. See, e.g., J.C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 1343 (1995).
71. The report, based in part on 10 intensive case studies of recent class actions in the
United States, suggests that the key to improving outcomes and eliminating abuses in class ac-
tion litigation over money damages is increased regulation of settlements and fee awards by
judges equipped with the training, resources and determination to do the job. A copy of the ex-
ecutive summary of this work can be found at (www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR969.1.pdf).
See also DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL, CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS
FOR PRIVATE GAIN (2000).
72. See Class Proceedings Act,  S.O., supra note 24, § 29(2).
73. See Dabbs v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, supra note 35 (holding that simulta-
neous negotiation of lawyers’ fees and class settlement is not improper, relying upon the U.S.
Supreme Court decision in Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986)).  It is submitted that even if
Evans is a sound decision in the U.S. context, it should have no application in the Canadian con-
text, where the fee regime is quite different. Canadian courts should refuse to approve settle-
ments where counsel for the parties have simultaneously negotiated the class lawyers’ fees and
the class settlement. For detailed arguments in support of this analysis, see Garry D. Watson &
Michael McGowan, Annual Survey of Recent Developments in Civil Procedure, in ONTARIO
CIVIL PRACTICE (Garry D. Watson & Michael McGowan eds., 1999).
74. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., supra note 69; see also J.C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action Ac-
countability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100 COLUM. L.
REV. 370 (2000).
75. An explanation for this would be that Canadian judges do not share the “docket clear-
ing mentality” that the Rand study, supra note 71, attributes to the U.S. judiciary.
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made.76  Another recent decision from the Ontario Superior Court,
Epstein v. First Marathon Inc.,77 underscores the importance of courts
taking seriously (as stressed in the Rand Study) their statutory duty to
scrutinize proposed settlements. The court in Epstein refused to ap-
prove the settlement of a class action attacking a merger transaction.
Under the terms of the settlement, the plaintiff lawyer would have re-
ceived a payment of $190,000, conditional upon dismissal of the class
proceeding, but the agreement did not provide any benefit to any
class members on whose behalf the action was originally filed.  Mr.
Justice Cumming emphasized that policymakers imposed the re-
quirement of judicial approval to check the potential abuse of class
actions. Citing legislative debates at the time the Ontario Class Pro-
ceedings Act was introduced, Mr. Justice Cumming noted, “the
court’s role in the implementation of class-action reform would be
critical to the effectiveness of the new legislation.”78 In Epstein, the
court determined that “Mr. Epstein’s action is in the nature of a
‘strike suit.’”79 Approving the settlement would in effect reward con-
duct counter-productive to the “important policy objectives” of “ac-
cess to justice, judicial economy and behaviour modification,” and
was therefore rejected.80
C. Counsel Fees
Courts have recognized explicitly that the success and survival of
the class action regime depends upon risk-taking by lawyer-
entrepreneurs who must be given a premium fee when they win.81  To
date, Canadian courts have avoided the enormous U.S.-type fees re-
sulting from fee awards based on thirty-three percent or forty percent
of the settlement amount.82  In the Hepatitis C litigation, which settled
for $1.5 billion, plaintiffs’ counsel received fee awards in the 2-4%
76. See Parsons v. Canadian Red Cross Soc’y, supra note 12.  The changes were subse-
quently made and the settlement was approved.
77. [2000] O.J. No. 452 (Ont. Sup. Ct.) (online Quicklaw), 94 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1062 (Can.).
78. Id. at ¶ 39.
79. Id. at ¶ 71.
80. Id.
81. See Gagne v. Silcorp Ltd., supra note 18.
82. On the approach of U.S. courts to the determination of counsel fees in “common fund”
class actions, see HERBERT NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, § 14.03
(3d ed. Supp. 2000) (there is no general rule as to what is a reasonable fee award in common
fund cases, but the upper limit seems to be 50%; for securities and antitrust suits, 20-30% of the
fund is a normal fee; these percentages decrease with large recoveries and increase with smaller
recoveries).
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range, which still netted them $53 million nation-wide.83  However,
there have been numerous 20-25% fees, particularly in British Co-
lumbia and Quebec.84
VI.  SOME OTHER ISSUES THAT HAVE ARISEN IN
CLASS ACTIONS
Other issues that have been addressed to date in Canadian case
law on complex civil litigation include when and how both plaintiffs
and defense lawyers may communicate with class members,85 how the
principles of res judicata apply to class action decisions,86 and whether
defendants’ settlement proposals in the form of Alternative Dispute
Resolution Programs should be treated as a “preferable procedure”
within the meaning of the class action statutes.87
A range of issues regarding class actions, however, either have
not yet been addressed in Canadian case law or adequately dealt with
by the courts.  On the issue of certification, it is unclear what evi-
dence, if any, should be before the court on certification motions.  It
seems that the courts have not been sufficiently aware of the cost im-
83. See Parsons v. Canadian Red Cross Soc’y, supra note 12; Kreppner v. Canadian Red
Cross [1999] O.J. No. 3572 (Ont. Sup. Ct.) (Can.) (online QuickLaw) (joint reasons approving
counsel fees in two companion hepatitis C class proceedings; the first action related to trans-
fused patients and the second to hemophiliac patients). On the same day, the British Columbia
(B.C.) decision was handed down, Endean v. Canadian Red Cross Society, supra note 37, ap-
proving similar fees in the B.C. action.
84. See discussion in Parsons, supra note 12.
85. See Mangan v. Inco Ltd., supra note 32 (holding that communications from class coun-
sel to potential class members explaining how to obtain settlement proceeds was “notice” within
the meaning of the class action legislation, and granting injunctive relief and sanctions against
class counsel for making the communications without prior court approval).  Subsequently, in
Bywater v. TTC  [1999] O.J. No. 1402 (Ont. Gen. Div.)(Can.) (online Quicklaw) the court held
that the issuance of a press release by class counsel following the granting of certification was
not a “notice” requiring prior court approval.
86. See Allan v. CIBC Trust Corp. [1998] 39 O.R. (3d) 675 (Gen. Div)(Can.).  The only
case to date on the application of res judicata to class proceedings held that because of the
wording of the Class Proceedings Act, this doctrine operates quite differently than in non-class
proceedings. In non-class proceedings it is well established that claim preclusion applies not only
to matters that were actually litigated in the prior proceeding, but also to matters which could
and should have been litigated, such as matters arising out of the same transactions or occur-
rences that were litigated in the first action. However, § 27(3) of the Ontario Class Proceedings
Act limits the binding effect of the judgment on the common issues “set out in the certification
order.” See Class Proceedings Act, supra note 15.
87. For suggestions (in obiter) that such proposals constitute a “preferable procedure” that
may lead to a denial of certification, see Brimner v. Via Rail Canada Inc., supra note 44, and
Williams v. Mutual Life Assurance Co. of Canada, supra note 68.  For criticism of this approach
by the present Author, see Watson & McGowan, Annual Survey of Recent Developments in
Civil Procedure, in ONTARIO CIVIL PRACTICE (Watson & McGowan eds., 2001).
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plications of an expansive view of the admissible evidence on such
motions.  Concerning settlements, unresolved issues include under
what circumstances, if any, the parties should be entitled to simulta-
neously negotiate damages and costs payable to the plaintiff or fees
payable to plaintiff’s counsel,88 and how the plaintiff’s counsel and the
court should deal with the defendant’s desire to pay the plaintiff’s
costs (or fees) as part of the settlement.  Should the court appoint
counsel to advise the court on the fairness of the settlement, at least
where there are no well–funded and well–represented objectors?
Regarding fees to class counsel, there are also various unresolved
issues, such as whether fees should be set and approved early in the
action subject to later review, whether fees should be awarded (as
suggested in the Rand study) by reference to amounts actually paid to
class members rather than by reference to the global amount of the
settlement, and what the defendant’s role should be, if any, in the
court’s determination of plaintiff’s counsel’s fees.89
In mass tort cases it has become common for a  “national class
action” to be commenced in Ontario (excepting residents of B.C. and
Quebec) and separate provincial class actions to be commenced in
B.C. and Quebec.90 However joint settlement discussions typically
take place, with the defendants treating the three proceedings as one.
This pattern raises the question of the need for inter-provincial coop-
eration in class actions—for example, the desirability of joint hearings
by the several provincial courts when there are pending actions in
several provinces. (Without a joint hearing, if a settlement is ap-
proved first in, say Quebec, it is difficult for an Ontario court to then
disapprove the settlement, even if it has reservations.)  If such joint
hearings are indeed desirable, how can they be achieved? A related
issue is how to prevent the appearance of competing national classes
in more than one province giving the defendant the opportunity, as
has arisen in the United States,91 to conduct a “reverse auction” for
settlement.
88. See supra text accompanying note 73.
89. See Parsons v. Canadian Red Cross Soc’y [2001] O.J. No.214 (Ont. C.A.) (Can.) (online
Quicklaw) (holding that the defendant had no standing to appeal the fee determination in favor
of plaintiff’s counsel).
90. See, e.g., Endean v. Canadian Red Cross Soc’y, supra note 37; Parsons v. Canadian Red
Cross Soc’y, supra note 12.
91. See Coffee, supra note 74.
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VII.  OVERALL, HAVE CLASS ACTIONS IN CANADA BEEN
A GOOD THING FOR THE CITIZENRY?
Although it is apparent that some judges are unsympathetic to
some class actions, on the whole, the Canadian judiciary seems to
have recognized that class actions have an important and valuable
role to play by affording access to justice to many who could never in
their wildest dreams hope to litigate individually.  Proposals have
been made to extend the class action regime by introducing them in
the Federal Court of Canada,92 in Manitoba,93 and in Alberta.94  On
the issue of whether class actions have been a good thing for the citi-
zenry of Canada, if the “proof of the pudding is in the eating,” one
could ask the class members who shared in the proceeds of the class
actions settled or litigated to date (e.g., the $5,000 recovered by each
of the class members in the action relating to wrongly withheld inter-
est on deposits on condominium purchases,95 $50 million-plus recov-
ery in the breast implant litigation,96 the $140 million recovery in the
vanishing premium cases,97 and the $1.5 billion recovery in the Hepa-
titis C litigation98), keeping in mind that without a class action regime,
it is unlikely that any of this money would ever have been recovered
in Canada.  On the other hand, there is little if any evidence to date of
the “successful”99 use of class actions as a form of litigation black-
mail—bringing groundless class actions to extract unfounded settle-
ments from defendants.
92. See Class Proceedings in the Federal Court of Canada, Federal Court of Canada Circu-
lar No.2/2000, http://www.fct-cf.gc.ca/bulletins/notices/circular2_e.shtml.
93. See MANITOBA LAW REFORM COMM’N, Class Proceedings, Report #100 (Manitoba
Publications Branch, Jan. 1999).
94. See ALBERTA LAW REFORM INSTITUTE, Class Action, Final Report #85 (Dec. 2000).
95. See Windisman v. Toronto College Park Ltd., supra note 39 (successful class action by
purchasers of condominiums against the developer for interest on monies paid as deposits; at
trial the amount recovered was approximately $2.6 million).
96. See, e.g., Serwaczek v. Medical Eng’g Corp., supra note 34 (breast implant litigation
settled for some $29 million). This is only one of several such breast implant settlements in Can-
ada.
97. These cases involve alleged misrepresentations by life insurers that if premiums are
paid for a number of years the policies will become fully paid as a result of favorable investment
of the premiums by the insurers.  See Dabbs v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, supra note
35; McKrow v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., supra note 35 (court approval of the settlement of
“vanishing premium” life insurance policy cases). There have also been approvals of other
similar settlements in British Columbia and Quebec.
98. See Parsons v. Canadian Red Cross Soc’y, supra note 12.
99. See Epstein v. First Marathon Inc., supra note 77.  Epstein was just such a case in which
the court “thwarted” payment to plaintiff’s lawyer in order to settle the case.
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VIII.  WHAT CAN OTHER JURISDICTIONS LEARN FROM
THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE?
Other jurisdictions should give serious thought to introducing
class actions if, as was the case in Canada, there are many types of
lawsuits arising from mass wrongs which are simply not being brought
because of prohibitive costs. I suspect this is likely to be the case in
many jurisdictions.
In the political battle that will almost certainly ensue over any
proposal to introduce class actions, I suggest that little weight be
given to the views of those who will likely be defendants, such as
manufacturers and corporations.  They will of course object, but the
fact is that the high cost of individual litigation often permits them to
escape liability.  If they are not liable at law, then class actions will not
impose liability on them. (If I were in their position and were con-
cerned only for my own self interest, I would oppose class actions, but
that does not mean the opposition should be taken seriously.)
In light of the Canadian experience with class actions, it is rec-
ommended that other states engaged in drafting class action protocols
not set the certification hurdle too high or make the certification pro-
cess too expensive.  Indeed, policy makers should consider whether
certification is a necessary step for group litigation.100  There must be
procedures for defining the class and giving its members notice, but it
is not axiomatic that such actions should only be brought, in effect,
with leave of the court.  Also, the judiciary should be involved in
drafting the legislation or policy so that when it comes time to imple-
ment the laws, the judiciary will be better able to decide the legisla-
tive intent.
If the jurisdiction in which the class action legislation is to be im-
plemented is not a “fee shifting” jurisdiction, policy-makers should
consider the compatibility of class actions and fee shifting.  If a deci-
sion is made to introduce class actions, the procedure may not work if
the representative plaintiff is liable for the successful defendant’s
costs.  In administering a class action regime, the judiciary must be
aware of the potential for conflict of interest between the class mem-
100. For example, the class action procedure in the Federal Court of Australia has no re-
quirement of certification by the court. However, the procedure spells out the (minimal) re-
quirements for the bringing of proceedings as a class action, and if in any given case the defen-
dant believes these requirements have not been met, a motion to dismiss the proceeding will be
brought.  See Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (as amended 1991), Part IVA Representative
Actions, s.33P   
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bers and class counsel, and be vigilant in the processes of settlement
and fee approval.
